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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/05/2006

Accident number: 178

Accident time: 09:00

Accident Date: 14/03/1996

Where it occurred: Samaki, Thmar Pourk
District, Banteay
Meanchey Province
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Cambodia

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 17/03/1996

ID original source: LK (date inferred)

Name of source: HT (field)

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: agricultural (recent)
residential/urban

Date record created: 14/02/2004

Date last modified: 18/05/2006

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
At the time of the accident the demining group were using two-man teams and a one-man
drill. In this, one deminer used the detector, searched for tripwires, cut undergrowth and
excavated finds while his partner watched from a distance and "controlled" him. The demining
group issued frontal protection and their drills assumed the deminer would kneel or squat
while excavating.
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An internal investigation was carried out on 16th March 1996 by an expatriate. The undated
report was made available by the demining group's country manager. The following
summarises its content.
The mined area was a village, recently repopulated by returning refugees, parts of which had
been heavily mined by the Vietnamese in 1982. The demining platoon started clearance
operations on 6th January 1996 and had been finding an average of three PMNs per day.
At approximately 09:00 the victim detonated a PMN while investigating a detector signal with
his prodder. He sustained a traumatic amputation of his left thumb and forefinger, grazing to
his left upper arm and to the lower half of his face, and "a slight laceration to the cornea of his
left eye" that caused 50% blindness in this eye. He was also bleeding from both ears. The
victim was wearing body armour and a visor.
After receiving first aid he was taken to a hospital at Taphaya, Thailand about 8km away, and
then to Aranyaprathet Hospital, Thailand. His hand could not be saved and was amputated at
Aranyaprathet. His eyesight and his hearing on his left side gradually improved.
The investigators stated that the victim "was investigating a signal situated to the left side of
his clearing lane. The signal could be heard when the locator was passed one head's width to
the side of the one meter lane but the mine was about 15cm beyond that. The total distance
from the left side of the lane is about 30cm". The victim had been investigating this signal for
two minutes before the mine detonated, but did not know that it was a mine as he could
neither see nor feel it.
"All injuries were sustained on the left side of the deminer only so it is unlikely that he had
turned properly (contrary to the Section Commander's statement) to investigate the signal
which would tend to suggest he didn't take the investigation seriously and thus prodded into
the mine". [The parentheses are in the original.]
The chest protector performed well but the visor "shattered completely on impact with the
shock wave and debris from the mine. After the accident only two large pieces from the top
half of the visor could be recovered as the lower half disintegrated".
Statements were taken from the victim and the Section Commander, who was acting as the
deminer's partner at the time. Full copies were not included in the report.

Conclusion
The internal investigators concluded that the accident was not avoidable. They thought that
the mine was probably initiated by the prodder touching the pressure pad and that it was
"likely but not certain" that the mine had been tilted by the act of a farmer planting a banana
tree nearby.

Recommendations
The internal investigators found that no changes in SOP were required but recommended that
the strength of the visors in use should be investigated. They also said that when a deminer
"requires treatment at a Thai hospital the staff there must be informed immediately.... that he
is covered by insurance...... This will ensure that he receives the best treatment that the
Hospital can offer".

Victim Report
Victim number: 227

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded
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Protection issued: Long visor

Protection used: Short frontal vest,
Long visor raised

Short frontal vest

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Eye
severe Hearing
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Hand
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because it seems
likely that the victim was either allowed to walk into an uncleared area, or a cleared area
where a mine had been missed. It is possible that the area reduction and survey were poor
and he entered a dangerous area unknowingly, which would be a higher management failing.
The secondary cause is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy”.
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